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1 Introduction
A key aspect of entrepreneurial activity consists in deciding whether and when to make
investments on the basis of the ex ante impressions decision makers get from the projects
that reach them. In a Bayesian framework, the impression would be modelled as a signal
received by the decision maker. Together with the knowledge of how signals, returns
and costs are jointly distributed, the decision maker would be able to make the optimal
investment decision using the standard Bayesian updating machinery. Yet, it is not clear
how decision makers would know the joint distribution of signals, returns and costs.
Instead, decision makers are likely to look at implemented projects and consider the
realized returns observed in those projects so as to build statistics (even informally) about
what impressions imply in terms of the distribution of returns.1
A natural approach consists for the decision maker in aggregating the returns observed
in those implemented projects that look similar to the current project of interest in the
sense of delivering the same impression to the decision maker from an ex ante viewpoint.
The decision maker would invest in a current project associated with some impression a
if the returns observed over the implemented projects associated to the same impression
a for him are su¢ ciently high in a statistical sense that may in general depend on the risk
tolerance of the decision maker as well as his estimate of the costs. For example, if the
decision maker is risk neutral and knows the cost c -an assumption that is maintained for
simplicity in the rest of the paper- he would invest if the observed mean return exceeds
the cost c in the considered pool, and he would not invest otherwise.
Given a pool of implemented projects, the heuristics just proposed would give rise to
a new distribution of implemented projects for the current generation of decision makers,
and this new distribution would itself be used for the derivation of the investment strategy
of the next generation of investors. Assuming stationarity in the arrival of new projects
and decision makers, I am interested in understanding the properties of the steady states
generated by such dynamic systems, which I will refer to as equilibria with sampling
investors.
When analyzing such equilibria, I will be assuming that the impressions obtained by
1The very reason why statistics would in general rely excusively on such data is that data on non-
implemented projects are typically not accessible.
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investors about a given project need not be the same across investors. More precisely,
every investors impression about a given project will be modelled as an independent
signal realization drawn from a distribution assumed to be common to all investors and
that typically depends on the return of the project. I will also be assuming that a higher
realization of investors signals is more representative of a higher return in the sense
that the joint distribution of the return and investors signals satises the monotone
likelihood ratio property. A canonical illustration (routinely considered in nance models,
see for example Grossman and Stiglitz, 1976) stipulates that conditional on the return x,
the impression of investor i takes the form ai = x + "i where "i is the investor-specic
realization of a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance . While such a specication
will be used to illustrate the main ndings, I am allowing for more general specications
of the distribution of impressions and returns.
The main ndings of the paper are as follows. In equilibrium, no matter what im-
pression investors get from their project, sampling investors have an overly optimistic
assessment of the expected returns of their project. As a result, there is more investment
in the equilibrium with sampling investors than what the optimal strategy based on the
knowledge of the distribution of signals and returns would dictate. Modelling the impres-
sion as a noisy signal about the return as described above, I note that the overoptimism
bias is more pronounced for intermediate realizations of the impressions, and that the
welfare loss induced by the excessive investment is lowest either when the noise is small
or when it is very signicant so that the biggest welfare loss is obtained for intermediate
levels of informativeness of the impressions. Finally, when investors are either rational
(making the optimal investment decisions) or sampling, I note that the overoptimism and
overinvestment biases of the sampling investors are all the more severe that the share
of rational investors is bigger, thereby illustrating a negative externality that rational
investors impose on sampling investors.
The overoptimism and overinvestment biases identied in this paper are the con-
sequences of two ingredients: the selection neglect implicit in the heuristics used by
sampling investors and the hypothesis that the impressions given by the same project
are not the same across investors.2 Each e¤ect is key for the derivation of the biases.
2The monotone likelihood ratio property also plays a role as illustrated later through an example.
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Clearly, as a direct implication of the law of large numbers, if decision makers could have
access also to non-implemented projects, the heuristics of sampling investors (now allow-
ing for the aggregation of both implemented and non-implemented projects according to
the delivered impression) would lead them to have the correct estimate of the expected
return for each possible impression. But, the samples considered by sampling investors
are biased in that they include only projects that were implemented, and these are not
randomly drawn projects. The sampling heuristics can be viewed as reecting a kind of
selection neglect in that it treats the biased samples as if they were not biased. Selection
neglect has been documented in a number of psychological studies (Nisbett and Ross,
1980), and even if decision makers were aware of selection bias, it would be very hard
to fully adjust for it.3 But, selection neglect alone is not enough to explain the overop-
timism and overinvestment biases arising in the equilibrium with sampling investors. If
all investors were to get the same impression about any given project, there would be no
pro-investment bias in equilibrium. Biases would not arise in this case because assuming
investment occurs with positive probability for some impression, the sample of implemen-
ted projects associated with that common impression would be unbiased. The dispersion
of beliefs even when exposed to the same objective facts has been documented in various
elds in particular in expertssurveys about ination expectations (Mankiw et al., 2004)
or in relation to tradersreactions to public announcements (Kandel and Pearson (1995)).
Likewise, it is most likely at work regarding investorsimpressions about objectively sim-
ilar projects.
An illustrative example:
To illustrate some of the main ndings, consider a setting in which the returns can
take two equally likely values x, x with the cost c lying in between these two values, i.e.
3From a theoretical viewpoint, correcting the bias would require some structural knowledge about how
impressions are generated and how other investors process the data. While dispensing from a parametric
knowledge, the knowledge that the impressions of di¤erent investors are iid conditional on the return
realization would still be required and such a knowledge cannot be inferred from the data (see Manski
(2004) for related discussions as to why correcting the selection bias requires a lot of knowledge). From
an empirical viewpoint, Elton et al. (1996) show that the bias persists in the context of assessing the
performance of funds even though everyone there is aware that funds have a tendency to disappear when
they perform poorly and thus that the sample consisting of still alive funds is not representative of all
funds.
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x < c < x. Assume decision makers can get three possible impressions labelled Good,
Medium and Bad, and when the return is high (resp. low), the decision maker gets an
impression that is either Good (resp. Bad) or Medium each with probability half. Thus,
when the impression is Good, it is optimal to invest, since a Good impression can only
come form a high return project. Similarly, when the impression is Bad, it is optimal to
not invest, since a Bad impression can only come from a low return project. Assuming
that c > x+x
2
, it is optimal to not invest when the impression is Medium, since given the
symmetry of the problem, Bayesian updating would then tell the decision maker that the
two returns x and x are equally likely.
Consider a sampling investor who would observe in his pool only projects handled
by rational investors. Since rational investors invest only when their impression is Good,
the pool of implemented projects would all have high returns. Thus, a sampling investor
would choose to invest when getting impression Medium, since half of the implemented
projects would give him impression Medium and all of them would correspond to a high
return. In the equilibrium with sampling investors only, decision makers invest more
than in the rational case, but potentially less than a sampling investor would do when
surrounded with rational investors only. The reason why the investment decisions of
sampling investors may be altered is that the presence of sampling investors results in
the presence of low return projects in the pool of implemented projects, and such a
compositional e¤ect reduces the pro-investment bias, even if it does not eliminate it, as
implied by the main result of the paper. More precisely, within the proposed example,
in the equilibrium with sampling investors only, when c < 2x+x
3
decision makers invest
when they get impressions Good or Medium, but when c > 2x+x
3
, only a fraction of
projects associated to impression Medium is implemented by sampling investors and the
perceived expected return associated to that impression coincides exactly with the cost c
in equilibrium.4
4Observe that if the impressions obtained by di¤erent investors were always the same, investment when
the impression isMedium would not be possible. By contradiction, if investment sometimes occured with
the Medium impression, a sampling investor would rightly get at the conclusion when the impression is
Medium that there is an equal chance that the return is high or low (unlike in the dispersed impression
scenario in which some projects delivering impression Medium had been decided by investors who had
got a Good impression), and thus he would not invest.
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Related literature:
This paper can be viewed as bringing together ideas from the literatures on over-
condence, bounded rationality, and econometrics combining them in a novel way. The
econometrics literature has been discussing at length selection bias but essentially from
the viewpoint of the analyst, assuming economic agents are perfectly rational (see Heck-
man, 1979). By contrast, this paper assumes that sampling investors are subject to
selection neglect, and it analyzes the consequences this may cause on the e¢ ciency of the
decision making. The literature on overcondence has documented that entrepreneurs
tend to be overly optimistic about their projects (see for example Cooper et al. (1988)
or Malmendier and Tate (2005)), which has generally been used to justify that investors
rely on subjective priors or attach excessive precision to the signals they receive (see for
example Xiong (2013) or Daniel and Hirshleifer (2015) for such a use in nance models).
By contrast, this paper derives the overoptimism bias from selection neglect, assuming
only the data about implemented projects are available to investors. As mentioned above,
the equilibrium approach pursued in this paper allows me to relate the degree of overop-
timism to the informativeness of the objective signals received by the investors, which
can in principle be tested (and would not be implied by the subjective prior approach).5
Finally, the literature on bounded rationality has developed various solution concepts
allowing for misspecied expectations (see in particular, the analogy-based expectation
equilibrium (Jehiel, 2005), and the cursed equilibrium (Eyster and Rabin, 2005)), and
it has sometimes connected such equilibrium approaches to selection bias (see in par-
ticular the behavioral equilibrium (Esponda, 2008)). This paper adopts an equilibrium
perspective in line with the solution concepts just mentioned, but unlike the previous
approaches it applies it to pure decision problems and derives the overoptimism bias in
such non-strategic contexts.6
5Theoretical approaches to overcondence that complement the one discussed in this paper include:
1) Rabin and Schrag (1999) who derive overcondence from another psychological bias, the conrmatory
bias that leads agents to sometimes behave as if they had not made observations that go against their
current beliefs, 2) Van den Steen (2004) who denes overcondence as the subjective belief that one
performs better than others, which Van den Steen derives from a revealed preference argument in a
subjective prior world - Van de Steens insight will be further discussed later, and 3) several studies
that derive overcondence from motivated cognition purposes among which Bénabou and Tirole (2002),
Köszegi (2006) or Bénabou (2015).
6Viewing nature as a player, I suggest later how the equilibrium with sampling investors can be viewed
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Relating erroneous judgements to selection neglect appears in other studies. For ex-
ample, Denrell (2003) discusses how one can wrongly believe that risky projects are as-
sociated with high mean performance if data on failed projects are not accessible or less
visible (essentially because large negative shocks tend not to be recorded in the access-
ible data).7 However, to the best of my knowledge, this paper is the rst to consider an
equilibrium approach to this in the sense of viewing the pool of data agents have access
to as resulting from the erroneous judgments agents make based on their observations.
The endogeneity discussed here is essential for example for the understanding of why the
presence of extra rational investors makes the overoptimism bias worse (which is con-
sistent with the empirical nding of Lerner and Malmendier (2013) who observe that a
higher share of entrepreneurial peers decreases entrepreneurship, see subsection 4.3 for
elaborations).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the investment prob-
lem. Section 3 analyzes the overoptimism and overinvestment biases arising in the equilib-
rium with sampling investors. Section 4 develops further insights in particular allowing for
a mix of rational and sampling investors, and adding dynamic considerations in relation
to cycling and the convergence to steady state.
2 The investment problem
A large number of investors idealized as a continuum is considered. Each investor assumed
to be risk neutral has to decide whether or not to invest in one project that is di¤erent for
as an analogy-based expectation equilibrium after appropriately dening the extensive-form game and
the required analogy partitions (see the working paper version Jehiel (2015) for more details). I believe
such connections are useful in that they allow to develop a unifying theme of the e¤ects of imperfect
learning over di¤erent applications. In a recent paper, Spiegler (2016) discusses how to interpret the
equilibrium with sampling investors using the tool of Bayesian networks that he has recently introduced
into economics. It should be mentioned that his interpretation requires that decision makers would have
access to the joint distribution of signals and returns, and in this case I would argue decision makers
should be able to make the optimal investment decisions.
7In a very di¤erent context, Streufert (2000) discusses the idea that parents of poor neighborhoods
may not consider the data of successful youngsters who would leave the neighborhood, and as a result
would have a downard biased perception of the returns to schooling. As Denrell though, he does not
discuss how the schooling decisions generated by such erroneous perceptions would a¤ect the pool of data
from which agents base their estimates.
7
each investor. The cost of every project is c. The return of a project is random and can
take various possible values x in a set X  R (assumed for simplicity to consist of nitely
many values). Before making his decision, an investor knows the cost c but does not
know the return realization x of his project. However, he observes a signal realization a
for his project. The signal realization a can be thought of as representing the impression
that the investor gets from the project. It takes values in (a; a) with a < a (where I
allow that a =  1 and a = +1).8 Based on a, the investor has to decide whether
or not to invest. If the project is implemented (i.e., the investor decides to invest), it
is accessible by everyone, and the obtained return x is assumed to be freely observable.
Non-implemented projects are not accessible. When an investor has access to a project,
he can freely generate an impression similarly to how he generates an impression for his
own project. That is, he can observe a signal realization a for every implemented project.
It should be mentioned that investors are not assumed to be observing the impressions of
other investors. They only observe their own impressions.
Returns and impressions are generated similarly for all projects and for all investors.
Importantly, I assume that conditional on a return realization, the impressions of two
di¤erent investors are statistically independent so as to reect that impressions are inu-
enced by e¤ective returns but investorsimpressions (about the same objective project)
are heterogeneous. Specically, for each project, the probability that the return realiz-
ation be x 2 X is l(x)  0 with
X
x2X
l(x) = 1. Conditional on the realization x of a
project, the signal realization a observed by any investor for this project is assumed to
be distributed according to the density f( j x) with support (a; a), and two di¤erent
investors i and i0 get two independent draws ai, ai0 from this distribution. Assuming that
the distribution of a takes the form of a density will simplify the exposition of the analysis
but is not required (both the example in introduction and one example below assume a
can take nitely many values). For concreteness, one may think of the situation in which
the impression a would take the form x+ " where x is the return and " is the realization
of a noise term for example distributed according to a normal distribution with mean 0
and variance . While such a specication will serve as the leading example to illustrate
8In the sequel, for any continuous function g(), I will refer to lima!a g(a) (resp. lima!a g(a)) as g(a)
(resp. g(a)).
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the main results, the analysis developed next allows for much more general specications
of the distributions of the impression as a function of the return.
If the investor knew how the signal realization a and the return realization x are jointly
distributed, he could adjust the optimal strategy. Given the assumed risk neutrality, the
optimal investment strategy requires the investor to invest upon observing a whenever
E(x j a) > c and to not invest whenever E(x j a) > c where E(x j a) is derived from l()
and f( j x) by Bayeslaw, i.e.,
E(x j a) =
P
x2X l(x)f(a j x)  xP
x2X l(x)f(a j x)
:
In the following, I will assume that the optimal strategy requires that, for some signal
realizations a, it is best to invest.
Importantly, I am assuming that neither l() nor f( j ) is a priori known to the
investor. Instead, I am embedding the above investment environment into a multi-period
framework in which in every period, a new cohort of investors has to make investment
decisions similar to the ones just described, and investors design their investment strategy
by considering the past data accessible to them. According to the above observab-
ility assumptions, an investor in a given period can freely access those past projects
that were implemented, observe the corresponding returns and derive the associated sig-
nals/impressions according to the process described above. I am assuming that in order
to decide whether or not to invest, investors adopt the following heuristic. When getting
a signal realization (an impression) a for his current project, the decision maker gathers
all projects in the past for which he gets the same signal realization (impression) a. Then
he computes the empirical mean return in those projects (this only requires averaging
the x observed in those projects having the same a signal realization), and he invests
whenever the obtained empirical mean return is above the cost c, and he does not invest
otherwise. I will consider the steady states of such a dynamic system and refer to the
resulting investment strategies as equilibria with sampling investors (in Section 4, I briey
consider whether and when the dynamic system converges to a steady state). In order to
rule out trivial situations in which there would be no investment at all, I will also assume
that whatever the observed signal there is a tiny probability (assumed to be the same for
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all signal realizations) that the decision maker invests.
To dene formally an equilibrium with sampling investors, let q(a) denote the (steady
state) probability with which an investor observing a would invest, and assume q is
bounded away from 0 for some positive measure of signals. The probability of observing
an implemented project with return x conditional on the impression a being in A  (a; a)
would be
Pr(x j a 2 A; implemented; q) = l(x) Pr(a 2 A, implemented j x; q)X
x02X
l(x0) Pr(a 2 A, implemented j x0; q)
where
Pr(a 2 A, x j implemented; q) = Pr(a 2 A j x)
Z a
a
q(b)f(b j x)db
given that a randomly drawn project with return realization x would be implemented
with probability
Z a
a
q(b)f(b j x)db (the investor in charge of such a project would receive
signal b according to the density f( j x) and invests then with probability q(b)).
Thus, the empirical mean return of implemented projects for which the investor gets
the signal realization a would be
bv(a; q) =
P
x2X l(x)f(a j x)
Z a
a
q(b)f(b j x)db  x
P
x2X l(x)f(a j x)
Z a
a
q(b)f(b j x)db
as results from the induced proportion of projects with return x in the pool of implemented
projects associated to impression a. This leads to the following denition:9
Denition 1 An investment strategy q() over (a; a) that induces some investment with
positive probability is an equilibrium with sampling investors if q(a) > 0 implies bv(a; q)  c
and q(a) = 0 implies bv(a; q)  c.
9To present formally the equilibrium with trembles, one may dene the set Qn of q such that q(a)  1n
for all a, dene an 1n -equilibrium to be qn() such that qn(a) >
1
n implies bv(a; qn)  c and qn(a) = 1n
implies bv(a; q)  c; and dene an equilibrium to be the limit as n grows large of qn such that qn is an
1
n -equilibrium. Our assumption that the optimal investment strategy involves non-trivial investment will
imply that all equilibria must result in positive probability of investment.
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The strategy just dened is the result of a xed point. The probabilities q(b) with
which other investors choose to invest when getting signal b a¤ect the compositions of
return x projects in the pool of implemented projects, which in turn a¤ects the probability
with which an investor getting signal a is willing to invest. In equilibrium, these two
probability mappings should be the same.
Comments. 1) In the working paper version (see Jehiel, 2015), I envision projects
as being described by strings of attribute realizations and each individual investor as
observing just one attribute realization. Assuming there are as many attributes as there
are investors and that each attribute realization has the same distribution conditional on
the return realization, one gets a formulation similar to the one developed above. When
there are nitely many attributes, the observations of two di¤erent investors would not
be independent conditional on the return realization, which would result in some extra
complications (see the section on correlation in Jehiel, 2015). 2) One may interpret an
equilibrium with sampling investors as dened above as an analogy-based expectation
equilibrium (Jehiel, 2005) in which nature would be considered as a player, and the game
would let nature rst select a project describing the return realization and the vector of
signal realization for every investor, then the investor would have to decide whether or
not to invest on the basis of the observed signal and in case of investment nature would
implement the return realization. The analogy partition of a given investor required
to support the above equilibrium with sampling investors consists in bundling all the
decision nodes of nature regarding the (second) choice of return that correspond to the
same signal realization of the considered investor (see Jehiel (2015) for further details in
the multi-attribute specication).
3 Overoptimism as a result of selection bias
I analyze the above investment environment assuming that a higher signal realization is
more representative of a higher return. Such a condition is satised whenever conditional
on x, a is distributed according to a normal distribution with mean x and variance , and
it is satised for many other specications. In particular, it is without loss of generality
whenever there are two possible return realizations x = x, x, since then a can be reordered
11
so that the likelihood ratio f(ajx)
f(ajx) is increasing with a. Formally, the following monotone
likelihood ratio property is assumed to hold:
Assumption (MLRP): For any a0 > a and x0 > x, it holds that: f(a
0jx0)
f(ajx0) >
f(a0jx)
f(ajx) .
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3.1 Equilibrium characterization
Proposition 1 Under MLRP, there exists a unique equilibrium with sampling investors.
The equilibrium is such that for some threshold aS, a decision-maker chooses to invest
if the observed signal realization a is above aS and to not invest otherwise where aS is
uniquely dened by
P
x2X f(a
S j x)[1  F (aS j x)]l(x)  xP
x2X f(a
S j x)[1  F (aS j x)]l(x) =
(
 c if aS = a
c if aS 2 (a; a)
(1)
Proof of Proposition 1:
Suppose that, in equilibrium, investment occurs with probability q(a) when a 2 (a; a)
is observed. As already highlighted, the perceived expected return of a project with signal
realization a would then be:
bv(a; q) = Px2X l(x)f(a j x) R aa q(b)f(b j x)db  xP
x2X l(x)f(a j x)
R a
a
q(b)f(b j x)db
Since a ! bv(a; q) is increasing (whatever q()) by MLRP, one can infer that investors
must follow a threshold strategy, i.e. for some z, invest if a > z and do not invest if a < z
where z (if interior) is dened by bv(z; q) = c.
Dene
H(a; z) =
P
x2X l(x)f(a j x)[1  F (z j x)]  xP
x2X l(x)f(a j x)[1  F (z j x)]
(2)
This is the perceived expected return of an a-project when other investors follow the
z-threshold investment strategy. One has:
10Assuming f( j x) is smooth, this can be formulated as requiring that @f(ajx)=@af(ajx) is increasing in x.
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Lemma 1 Under MLRP, H(; ) is increasing in a and z.
Proof of Lemma 1. The monotonicity in a has already been noted. The mono-
tonicity in z follows from the observation that under MLRP, the hazard rate f(zjx)
1 F (zjx)
decreases with x (see any textbook or the monotone likelihood ratio entry of wikipedia)
and thus x!
@
@z
[1 F (zjx)]
1 F (zjx) =
 f(zjx)
1 F (zjx) increases with x. Q.E.D.
Given the assumption that there is some investment in the rational case, it follows
that H(a; a) > c. An equilibrium must employ a threshold strategy z as already noted
(by the monotonicity of H(; ) in a) and the threshold z must satisfy
H(z; z) =
8>><>>:
 c if z = a
c if z 2 (a; a)
 c if z = a
(3)
Given that H(a; a) > c, the monotonicity of H(; ) in the second argument implies that
H(a; a) > c, and thus the latter case can be ignored. Suppose then that H(a; a) < c. The
continuity of H ensures that there exists z 2 (a; a) satisfying H(z; z) = c. Hence, there
must exist z > a satisfying (3).
Consider now a  z1 > z2  a. Clearly, H(z1; z1) > H(z2; z2) and (3) cannot be sim-
ultaneously satised for z = z1 and z2. One concludes that there is only one equilibrium,
and that this equilibrium is a threshold equilibrium aS where aS is uniquely dened to
satisfy (1). Q.E.D.
Given that equilibrium is unique, one can unambiguously speak of the equilibrium
subjective value that an investor observing the signal realization a assigns to the expected
mean return of the project. It is denoted by vS(a). Using the denition (2) of H(; ), one
has vS(a) = H(a; aS) where aS is as dened in Proposition 1.
3.2 Comparison to the rational benchmark
A rational investor is dened to be one who makes the optimal investment decision based
on the true statistical distributions as dened by the densities f( j ) and the probabilities
13
l(). Accordingly, upon observing the realization a of the signal, a rational investor rightly
perceives the expected return of the project to be
vR(a) = E(x j a) =
P
x2X l(x)f(a j x)  xP
x2X l(x)f(a j x)
A rational investor invests if this value is above c and does not otherwise.
Let aR 2 (a; a) be uniquely dened by11
vR(aR) =
(
 c if aR = a
c if aR > a
A rational investor invests whenever a > aR and he does not when a < aR.
Using the H(; ) function introduced in (2), it is readily veried that vR(a) = H(a; a)
(since for all x, F (a j x) = 0), and thus aR is uniquely dened by
H(aR; a) =
(
 c if aR = a
c if aR > a
There are two ways to think of a rational decision maker, as just described. One way is
to hold the view that a rational investor knows l() and f( j ) to start with and does the
corresponding Bayesian updating when observing a, as already suggested. Another way
is to hold the view that a rational investor is an experienced decision maker who has had
su¢ ciently many learning opportunities to nd out the investment strategy (dened as a
function of the observed signal) that delivers the highest expected payo¤.
Whatever the interpretation of the rational investment strategy, I note that the sampling
heuristic used by decision makers to assess the expected return of a-projects in the equi-
librium shown in Proposition 1 leads them to have an overly optimistic perception as
compared with the rational perception, since H(a; aS) is bigger than H(a; a) (the rational
assessment) due to the monotonicity of H(; ) in its second argument. This observation
and its implication for the volume of investment is summarized in the next Proposition
11Uniqueness comes again from MLRP, which ensures that vR() is increasing in a. The fact that
aR < a comes from the assumption that there is investment with positive probability in the optimal
solution.
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whose complete proof appears in the Appendix.
Proposition 2 Under MLRP, in equilibrium, sampling investors overvalue the expected
returns of a-projects as compared with the rational benchmark whatever the signal ob-
servation a, i.e. vS(a)  vR(a) for all a. There is at least as much investment in the
equilibrium with sampling investors as in the rational benchmark. That is, aS  aR.
It is tempting to think that the overoptimism arising in the equilibrium with sampling
investors is the mere consequence of the fact that the subset of projects investors have
access to is biased toward having higher returns. However, this property alone would not
necessarily give rise to the overoptimism bias without the additional statistical structures
assumed in the main model. In particular, assume in contrast to the main model that
the impressions that di¤erent investors get about a given project are always the same
across investors (they may of course di¤er across projects). This can be modeled by
assuming that for every project with return x, every investor observes the same signal
a drawn from the distribution f( j x) (unlike in the main model in which two di¤erent
investors were assumed to get independent draws from f( j x)). In this case, letting
q(a) denote the steady state probability that there is investment whenever the (common)
signal realization is a and assuming that q(a) > 0 (which would always hold true if
some trembling behavior were assumed), the subjective assessment of a sampling investor
observing the signal realization a would be:P
x2X l(x)f(a j x)q(a)  xP
x2X l(x)f(a j x)q(a)
:
This expression simplies into the rational expression vR(a) shown above, thereby imply-
ing that there is no overoptimism bias in the corresponding equilibrium with sampling
investors. Note that there is no bias even though the sample investors have access to is
biased toward the high return ones (since in equilibrium only those projects for which
a > aR would be voluntarily implemented).
Thus, the overoptimism bias identied in Proposition 2 requires the combination of
the sampling heuristic and the assumption that the impressions produced by any project
are heterogeneous across investors. As it turns out, the MLRP assumption also plays a
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role in the result. While the MLRP assumption is a very natural one (it is without loss
of generality if x can take only two values and it holds whenever a is a noisy signal about
x for many specications of the noise distribution), I note that the result of Proposition
2 would not necessarily hold if the MLRP assumption were removed (still assuming as
in the main model that two di¤erent investors get independent draws from f( j x) for a
project with return x). This is illustrated through the following example.
Example 1 Returns x can take four values x =  2; 1; 1; 2 which are equally likely (i.e.,
l(x) = 1=4 for all x); a can take three values a = a1; a2; a3; cost c is 0. The distribution
of a given x is summarized in the following table in which the number at the intersection
of the ai row and the x column -referred to as pi(x)- is the probability that signal ai is
drawn conditional on the return realization being x.
2 1  1  2
a1 0:1 0:4 0:1 0:24
a2 0:1 0:31 0:5 0
a3 0:8 0:29 0:4 0:76
The rational investment strategy requires that there is investment when a = a1 or a2 but
not when a = a3.12 Noting that
X
x
pi(x)(p1(x)+p2(x))x is positive for i = 1 but negative
for i = 2; 3 implies that if all other investors were following the rational investment
strategy, a sampling investor would choose to invest when observing a1 but not when
observing a2 or a3. The equilibrium with sampling investors would then take the following
form: invest when observing a1, invest with probability  such that
X
x
p2(x)(p1(x) +
p2(x))  x = 0 when observing a2 and not invest when observing a3. Overall, there would
be less investment than in the optimal strategy, and the subjective assessment attached
to an a2 project -which would coincide with c = 0- would be lower than the rational
assessment.
12This follows because
X
x
pi(x)  x > 0 for i = 1; 2 for not for i = 3.
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3.3 Informativeness, overoptimism, and overinvestment
In order to illustrate the ndings obtained so far, it may be useful to consider the following
simple scenario. The cost c is normalized to 0. Return x can take two values x =  1
or x = 1 with the same probability (l(x) = 1=2 for x =  1 and 1). Conditional on x,
the signal a takes the form a = x + " where " is the realization of a normal distribution
with mean 0 and variance . In such a symmetric setting, the optimal strategy requires
to invest if a > 0 and to not invest otherwise. That is, aR = 0 (whatever ). After simple
arrangements, the threshold aS that arises in the equilibrium with sampling investors is
characterized by
PDF (aS + 1)(1  CDF (aS + 1)) = PDF (aS   1)(1  CDF (aS   1))
where PDF and CDF stand respectively for the density and the cumulative of the normal
distribution with mean 0 and variance . Clearly, aS < 0 given that PDF (1) = PDF ( 1)
and CDF (1) > CDF ( 1), which conrms the general result of Proposition 2. In the
next graph, the overoptimism bias vS(a)   vR(a) known to be positive by Proposition 2
is depicted as a function of a, assuming the variance  of the normal distribution is 1.13
1.
FIGURE 1
13By way of comparison, vR(0) = 0 and vR(+1) = 1.
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Interestingly, one observes that the bias is maximal for intermediate values of a and
goes to 0 as a approaches  1 or +1. This is no coincidence. When a approaches
either a =  1 (respectively, a = +1), the likelihood that the return is x = x (resp.
x) becomes very large.14 More generally, there would be no bias for extreme realizations
of a (for a close to a or a) whenever x can take two values x = x or x, x < c < x and
f(ajx)
f(ajx) approaches 0 (resp. +1) as a approaches a (resp. a). This is because as a mere
consequence of extreme signals being very informative, an investor observing such a signal
realization would mostly see projects with homogeneous return realizations in his sample,
thereby making the selection bias negligible.
Another quantity I consider now is the welfare loss induced in the equilibrium with
sampling investors as compared with the rational benchmark. In the context of the
example, the welfare loss can be expressed as
WL =
1
2
Z 0
aS
(PDF (a+ 1)  PDF (a  1))da
representing the aggregate loss due to the suboptimal implementation of projects with
signal realizations a falling in (aS; 0). The following graph depicts how WL varies with
the variance .15
FIGURE 2
14This is so because PDF (aS + 1)=PDF (aS   1)! +1 (resp.  1) as a!  1 (resp. +1).
15By way of comparison, the value of the expected maximal welfare is 0:5 when  = 0, 0:34 when
 = 1, and 0 when  =1.
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As can be seen, the welfare loss is single-peaked, converges to 0 as  goes to 0 or
+1, and is thus maximal for intermediate values of the overall informativeness of the
signal as parameterized here by . Such properties would hold more generally. Indeed,
when the signal is very informative, the e¤ect of the selection bias on the performance of
the decision made by sampling investors becomes negligible as already noted, and thus
when signals are globally informative with very high probability (as is the case when 
is large), the aggregate welfare loss is small. At the other extreme, when the signals are
poorly uninformative, in generic situations, either investors would always invest or they
would never invest, and when there is investment it would have to be optimal.16 Hence,
beyond the canonical example considered here, the maximal welfare loss would arise for
intermediate levels of the informativeness of the signals.
As illustrated above, the degree of overoptimism arising in the equilibrium with
sampling investors and the welfare consequences of it depend on the informativeness of
signals.17 Such a dependence would not necessarily arise in the subjective prior approach
to overoptimism, which typically puts no structure on how investors from their subjective
prior and thus on how overoptimism varies with the primitives of the model. It may be
mentioned here that within the subjective prior paradigm, Van den Steen (2004) makes
the interesting and simple observation that as a consequence of a revealed preference
argument, no matter how subjective priors are modelled, othersdecisions always look
(weakly) suboptimal from the subjective viewpoint of any agent, thereby leading to the
systematic subjective belief that one performs better than others. Such a relative overop-
timism bias would also arise in my setting. If one were to ask any given investor at an ex
ante stage (i.e., before he receives a signal realization for his project) whether he thinks he
would perform better than other investors, he would be a¢ rmative. Relative overoptim-
ism arises here for the very same reason highlighted by Van den Steen that the investor
believes (based on his subjective perception of the mapping between his perception and
16The considered example is non-generic in the sense that if investors receive no signal, they are
indi¤erent as to whether or not to invest, but the conclusion still holds true in this case, since whether
or not they invest it is equally good.
17This can in principle be the subject of empirical tests. In contexts in which market conditions are
very clear or very unclear (so that signals are either very informative or very uninformative), one should
observe less overoptimism bias than in contexts in which market conditions are partially predictable.
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the investment decision) that he can screen projects better than others.18
4 Further insights
4.1 When rational investors exert negative externalities
Suppose the population of investors is mixed. A share 1    of investors (referred to
the sampling investors) proceeds as described in the main model: They observe a signal
realization a for their project, sample all implemented projects in which they get the
same signal realization a, and invest if the observed empirical mean return exceeds the
cost c. A share  of investors (referred to as rational investors) makes the optimal invest-
ment decision based on the observation of the signal realization. Signals and returns are
distributed as in the main model.
It should be noted that in the sample considered by the sampling investors, there are
both projects held by sampling investors and by rational investors. Since the decision
rule is not the same for sampling and rational investors, the selection bias is typically
a¤ected by the heterogeneity of the population of investors. The purpose of the next
Proposition is to investigate the e¤ect of cognitive heterogeneity on the performance of
sampling investors (rational investors are una¤ected by the presence of sampling investors
given that they face a decision problem and they behave optimally).
To pave the way toward the main result of this subsection, observe that sampling
investors follow in equilibrium a threshold strategy that consists in investing in a project
with signal realization a only if a exceeds a where a is dened by
P
x2X f(a
 j x)[(1  )(1  F (a j x)) + (1  F (aR j x))]l(x)  xP
x2X f(a
 j x)[(1  )(1  F (a j x)) + (1  F (aR j x))]l(x) =
(
 c if a = a
c if a 2 (a; a)
The left hand-side of this expression represents how a sampling investor subjectively
18Formally, his perceived ex ante payo¤ would be given by E(vS(a)   c j a > aS) Pr(a > aS) whereas
his perception of other investorsperformance would be correctly given by E(vS(a)) c where the density
of a is the one arising in the pool of implemented projects, i.e., fS(a) =
X
x
l(x)[1   F (aS j x)]f(a j
x)=
X
x
l(x)[1 F (aS j x)]. Since vS() is increasing and vS(aS) = c, the former expression is larger than
the latter, conrming Van den Steens relative overoptimism insight in the present setting.
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assesses the mean return of a project with signal realization a, and it requires in equilib-
rium that if a is interior, this perceived mean return should be equal to the cost c.
The di¤erence with the main model is that when a sampling investor makes an obser-
vation of another project, with probability  she is facing a rational investor who invests
only if the signal realization observed by the rational investor is larger than the rational
threshold aR (as dened in subsection 3.2), and with probability 1    she is facing an-
other sampling investor who invests if the signal realization he observes is larger than a.
Given that conditional on the return realization, the signals are independently distributed
across investors, the above expression follows.
Denote the above threshold a by aS(). One has previously seen that when there is
no rational investor around ( = 0), it holds that aS(0)  aR. The e¤ect of  on aS() is
unambiguously given by:
Proposition 3 Under MLRP, the higher the share  of rational investors, the more
severe the pro-investment bias of sampling investors. That is, aS() is weakly decreasing
in , and for all , aS()  aS(0)  aR.
The intuition behind Proposition 3 whose detailed proof appears in the Appendix is
simple. If an investor is surrounded with more rational decision makers, the decisions
made by others are better, and thus when sampling from these to form an assessment
regarding the protability of the project it appears to the investor that the project is even
more protable. The selection bias is more severe, which leads the investor to make a
poorer decision. In some sense, rational investors exert a negative externality on those
investors who follow the sampling heuristic.
It is natural to consider the e¤ect of an increase of  on welfare. Given Proposition 3,
an increase of  deteriorates the welfare of sampling investors, but at the same it increases
the share of rational investors whose welfare is larger. Aggregating these two e¤ects leads
to ambiguous comparative statics in general. When the share of rational investors is
su¢ ciently large, an increase of  always enhances expected welfare (essentially because
there are too few sampling investors who su¤er from the negative externality imposed by
rational investors). When the share of rational investors is su¢ ciently away from 1, the
negative e¤ect on sampling investors of increasing  may dominate for some distributional
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assumptions resulting in an overall negative impact of increasing the share of rational
investors on expected welfare.19
4.2 Convergence to steady state
Embedding the above framework into a dynamic setting in which new cohorts of investors
sample from previous cohorts of investors naturally leads to asking when we should expect
to see convergence to steady state as considered in the main analysis. Another legitimate
concern is whether the overoptimism bias identied in the main analysis would still arise
in case there would be no convergence. To model the dynamics most simply, consider
within the MLRP scenario discussed above a sequence of time periods t = 1; 2; ::: Assume
that in every period t > 1 there is a new cohort of investors of the same mass who sample
from the implemented projects handled by the cohort of investors living in period t  1,
and assume to x ideas that in the rst period investors choose to invest whatever signal
they observe.
In such a dynamic setting, investors in period t would adopt a threshold strategy
zt specifying to invest if the observed signal realization a is above zt and to not invest
otherwise where the sequence of zt would be characterized inductively by z1 = a (since the
rst generation of investors was assumed to invest always) and for all t > 1, the threshold
zt+1 would be uniquely dened by H(zt+1; zt) = c (assuming H(a; z) < c < H(a; z) for all
19To illustrate these two points, consider a two return x, x scenario with x < c < x and l(x) = l(x) =
1=2. Simple calculations yield that the marginal e¤ect of  on global welfare dWd can be written as
A+B
2
where
A =
Z aR
aS()
(f(a j x)(c  x)  f(a j x)(x  c))da
B = (1  )da
S()
d
(f(aS() j x)(c  x)  f(aS() j x)(x  c))
A (resp B) is shown to be postive (resp. negative) using the MLRP property, f(aR j x)(c  x) = f(aR j
x)(x  c), aS() < aR and da
S()
d < 0.
When  is close to 1, B becomes negligible and thus dWd > 0. When  is away from 1, A can be made
small relative to B by having a su¢ ciently small probability that signal realizations a fall in (aS(); aR)
(this is consistent with MLRP which only requires that f(ajx)f(ajx) is increasing in a, but puts no restriction on
how likely the various a are). In such cases, dWd < 0 holds. In the leading example in which conditional
on x, a = x + " where " is drawn from a normal distribution with variance  = 1, one can show that
dW
d > 0 for all .
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z). It appears that z2 coincides with aR, and using the monotonicity of H, it can be shown
by induction that the sequence (z2k+1)k1 is weakly decreasing and satises z2k+1  aS for
all k while the sequence (z2k)k1 is weakly increasing and satises z2k  aS for all k where
aS is the equilibrium threshold dened in Proposition 1. Thus, (z2k+1)k1 converges to
z and (z2k)k1 converges to z with z  aS  z. If z = z = aS the system converges
to the steady state described in Proposition 1. If z < aS < z, the system converges
to a limit two-period cycle in which in odd periods there is less activity as dictated by
the threshold strategy z and in even periods there is more activity as dictated by the
threshold strategy z. Whether the system converges or cycles depends on how the slope
@H=@z
@H=@a
compares to 1. When it is uniformly lower than 1, (as is the case for the leading
example with variance  = 1), there is convergence. When it is larger than 1 in the
neighborhood of a = z = aS, the two-period limit cycle prevails.20
It should be noted that in the above dynamics whether or not there is convergence,
the overoptimism and overinvestment biases hold in every period (this follows from the
monotonicity of H and the observation that H(aR; a) = c). Moreover, since zt  aR for
all t and z2 = aR, the monotonicity of H implies that the smallest zt which corresponds to
the most biased investment strategy is obtained in period 3 when the samples considered
by the current cohort consist of projects handled by rational investors. In all subsequent
periods, because sampled investors adopt suboptimal strategies, the sampling heuristic
leads to less severe biases.
4.3 Cycling with heterogeneous investors
It is natural to combine dynamics as just considered with the possibility that investors
could vary in their degree of sophistication, some of them being rational and others being
subject to selection neglect as proposed in the main model. A full-edged dynamic model
along these lines would aim at endogenizing entry and exit of entrepreneurs, assuming
for example entrepreneurssophistication vary with their experience. Analyzing such a
model is clearly beyond the scope of this paper. Yet, in order to illustrate that some
20If investors were sampling from all previous cohorts rather than just the most recent one, I suspect
the convergence scenario would be made more likely (because such a sampling device would smoothen
the reaction to previous behaviors), but more work is needed to establish this formally.
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rich dynamics can be expected, consider the following stylized setting. In each period
t = 1; 2; ::: a new cohort of agents decides whether or not to become entrepreneur. Every
entrepreneur faces the same distribution of projects as described above but agents may
have di¤erent outside options assumed to be drawn independently across agents from a
distribution with cumulative G. In every period, the share of rational agents is  and
the share of sampling agents is 1   . Let wR denote the expected payo¤ a rational
investor gets by becoming an entrepreneur (i.e., wR = E(max vR(a)   c; 0)), and let
wS() denote the expected payo¤ a sampling investor subjectively expects to get when
facing a share  (resp. 1   ) of rational (resp. sampling) investors.21 Rational agents
become entrepreneur whenever their outside option falls below wR, i.e. with probability
G(wR). Sampling agents who would sample from a mix  of rational investors and 1  of
sampling investors would become entrepreneur with probabilityG(wS()). Thus assuming
the cohort of (sampling) agents in period t samples from the implemented projects in
period t  1, the share t of rational investors in period t would follow the dynamic:
t =
G(wR)
G(wR) + (1  )G(wS(t 1))
:
As can be inferred from the above analysis, wS() is increasing in . Thus, a higher share
of rational investors in period t would lead more sampling agents to become entrepreneurs
in period t + 1, which would result in a lower share of rational investors in period t + 1.
Depending on the shape of G, such a dynamic system may either converge to a limit share
 of rational investors or lead to long term cycling between high and low shares (away
and respectively above and below ) of rational investors, corresponding respectively to
low and high levels of entrepreneurial activity.22 The prediction that there is more chance
to become entrepreneur if one is exposed to fewer (better skilled) entrepreneurial cases
should be subject of further empirical investigation, but it seems in agreement with Lerner
and Malmendiers (2013) nding that a higher share of entrepreneurial peers decreases
21With the notation previously introduced, wS() = E[max(H(a; aS())   c; 0)] where the density of
a is f(a) =
P
x2X f(ajx)[(1 )(1 F (a
S()jx))+(1 F (aRjx))]l(x)P
x2X([1 )(1 F (aS()jx))+(1 F (aRjx))]l(x)
:
22 is a solution to  = G(w
R)
G(wR)+(1 )G(wS()) and if G has su¢ cient mass around w
S() one should
expect cycling to emerge.
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entrepreneurship.23
23Lerner and Malmendier also note that the reduction is driven by a reduction in unsuccessful entre-
preneurial ventures, which can be related to our nding that when sampling from a more active cohort
the investment decisions get closer to the rational ones.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2: The rst part, vS(a)  vR(a), is proven noting that vS(a) =
H(a; aS), vR(a) = H(a; a) and using the monotonicity of H in z (see Lemma 1). As for
the second part, whenever aR < a, one has that H(aR; a)  c and thus H(aR; aR)  c
by the monotonicity of H in its second argument. This implies that aS  aR, as desired.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. DeneH(a; z; ) =
P
x2X f(ajx)[(1 )(1 F (zjx))+(1 F (aRjx))]l(x)xP
x2X f(ajx)[(1 )(1 F (zjx))+(1 F (aRjx))]l(x)
:
Lemma Under MLRP, H is increasing in a and z. It is decreasing in  for z  aR.
Proof. H increasing in a follows directly from MLRP.
H increasing in z follows from the observation that f(zjx)
(1 )(1 F (zjx))+(1 F (aRjx)) is de-
creasing in x, which is proven in the same way as the decreasing hazard rate property.24
H decreasing in  for z  aR follows because F (a
Rjx) F (zjx)
(F (aRjx) F (zjx))+1 F (zjx) is increasing in
x for z  aR, which follows because 1 F (a
Rjx)
1 F (zjx) is decreasing in x (which follows from the
fact MLRP implies the rst order stochastic dominance property noting that F (ajx)
1 F (zjx) is
the cumulative of F conditional on x and a being no smaller than z and that MLRP still
holds when we truncate the support of a). Q. E. D.
Proving that aS() is smaller than aR follows by noting thatH(aR; aR; )  H(aR; 0; 0).
Proving that aS() is decreasing follows by noting that for an interior solutionH(aS(); aS(); ) =
c, and thus if 0 > , H((aS(); aS(); 0)  c (by the monotonicity of H in ), which
implies that aS(0)  aS() (by the monotonicity of H in a and z). Q.E.D.
24Specically, integrate f(a1 j x1)f(a0 j x0)  f((a0 j x1)f(a1 j x1) (which holds for all a1  a0,
x1  x0) in a1 from a0 to a and multiply by 1    and integrate in a1 from aB to a and multiply by 
to obtain that
f(a j x0)
(1  )(1  F (aB j x0) + (1  F (a j x0)
 f(a j x1)
(1  )(1  F (aB j x1) + (1  F (a j x1)
as required.
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